Voter Dynamics A simple voter-politician attraction model

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Our Inspiration



Singapore's next General Election likely to be held in late 2024 at the earliest, analysts say

This comes after Prime Minister Lee Halen Loong revealed he will hand the reins to Deputy Prime Minister Lowrence Wong before the next General Election, and by November 2024 "If all acres well".



Louise Tang

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Our Inspiration

2024: The Super Election Year

Countries where a national election is/was held in 2024

Expected number of voters: 2B (~25% of world pop.) Share of free elections*: 38%



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Intuition behind our model

Polarization Surges Among the Politically Engaged

Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values, by level of political engagement

Increasing political polarisation across democracies

- Confirmation bias
- Social Endorsement
- Budget:
 - Money inveseted in campaigning social media, etc.
 - Political prowess



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Meelogical consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Depublican-Reaning independents, Democratis include Democratis-learning independents (see Appendix B). Politically engaged are defined as those who are registered to vote, follow government and public affairs most of the time and say they vote always or nearly always.

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 Allows us to assess whether voters are "aligned" with politicians

Could foreseeably be used to encode real life data

$$\Delta v_i = (p_i - v_i)\rho_{v,p}B_p,$$

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- B_p is the budget of politician p,
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where:

- ► B_p is the budget of politician p,
- ρ_{v,p} is the *correlation coefficient* on all the issues between voter v and politician p,
- ▶ and (p_i − v_i) is the difference between voter v and politician p on one specific issue.

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5. We don't account for voter-voter interaction.

Model Implementation

For each voter, for each politician, determine how voters shift their stance:

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```
VI_data = rnorm(ni*nv)
Pl_data = rnorm(ni*np)
b_data = runif(np, min = 0, max = 1)
VI = matrix(data = VI_data, nrow = nv, ncol = ni)
PI = matrix(data = PI_data, nrow = np, ncol = ni, byrow = T)
b = matrix(data = b_data, ncol = np, nrow = nv, byrow = T)
for (day in 1:days)
  rho <- cor(t(rbind(PI,VI)))[(np+1):(np+nv),1:np]
 ME <-- rho * b
  del_VI \leq matrix(data = 0, nrow = nv, ncol = ni)
  for(v in 1:nv){
    for(p in 1:np){
      if (ME[v,p] > 0) {
        del_VI[v,] = del_VI[v,] + (PI[p,] - VI[v,]) * ME[v,p]
      }
    }
  }
VI <-- VI + del_VI
```

Initial Findings

Process leads to varying outcomes w/ same parameters



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Initial Findings

Voters tend to converge towards a politician-stable points!



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Initial Findings

$\mathsf{Higher} \ \mathsf{budget} \neq \mathsf{winning}$

Voting Pattern under seed: 545



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Interesting Findings

Higher budget \approx winning for low number of politicians



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Interesting Findings

Higher budget \approx winning for high number of politicians for large no. of issues



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The End.

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